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ABSTRACT
Information Technology (IT) Risk Management is designed to 
confirm the sufficiency of information security. There are many 
risk management/assessment standards, e.g. IS0 27005:2011 
and NIST SP 800-30rev1, which are mainly designed for 
general organizations such as governments or businesses. 
Cyber risk assessment focused on military strategy has been 
rarely studied. Hence, this paper presents an innovative cyber 
risk assessment conceptual framework named “Cyber Risk 
Assessment (CRA)” which is extended from previous work 
with Military Risk Evaluation (MRE). This proposed CRA is 
the collection and integration of both quantitative and qualitative 
data. The Vulnerability Detection (VD) tools in Network Risk 
Evaluation (the previous studies) were used for the quantitative 
data collection and the focus group in the MRE (the proposed 
method) was used to collect qualitative data, which enhance the 
general risk assessment standard to achieve the objective of the 
research. The complexity of cyberspace domains with a military 
perspective is thoughtfully contemplated into the cyber risk 
assessment for national cyber security. Results of the proposed 
framework enable the possibility of cyber risk evaluation into 
score for national cyber security planning.
Keywords: Cyber risk assessment, risk management, cyber security, cyber 
warfare, Network Centric Warfare.
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INTRODUCTION
Risk management is a substantial solution to deal with IT risks. It integrates 
entire organization processes together. In accordance with ISO 31000:2009 
(ISO, 2009), risk assessment is the core process within risk management. 
There are 3 phases in risk assessment including risk identification, risk 
analysis and risk evaluation. Typically, organizations manage risks with risk 
assessment process in order to modify risk treatment as satisfied by the risk 
criteria. Numbers of IT and computer security standards have been developed 
and updated continuously to manage information security, e.g. ISO/IEC 27000 
Series (ISO/IEC, 2014) and NIST SP 800-82rev2 (NIST, 2015). Generally, 
information security management system (ISMS) standards, such as ISO 
27001:2013 (ISO, 2013), will explain the information security terminology 
and risk management process but leave methodology open for organizations 
to choose the most appropriate one for themselves. However, main concerns 
of these standards remain business continuity and disaster recovery. Risk 
management standards for some specific types of organization may be available. 
For example, ISO 27799:2016 (ISO, 2016) provides implementation guidance 
for the controls that could be effectively used for managing health information 
security. Unfortunately, risk management for extremely dangerous threats that 
could be part of Cyber Warfare (CW), for example, Advance Persistent Threat 
(APT)/Nation state, is not completely clarified by these famous standards and 
frameworks.
Cyberspace is the latest domain within a military battlefield. It is a logical 
domain which is very sophisticated and difficult to control. Also, there are 
many uncertain stakeholders in cyberspace. General users around the world 
could elevate themselves as anonymous cyber criminals, terrorists and warriors 
at any time. Attackers can penetrate targets via the World Wide Web (WWW) 
using reconditely technical skills and supported tools. Regular IT equipment 
could be converted into cyber weapons instantaneously. For threat to the nation 
state or corporate espionage to gain more military or economic advantage, 
it is much cheaper and more efficient to conduct cyber operations than use 
traditional spies. Many organizations and countries are developing plans and 
capabilities to use the WWW to cause or increase the impact of terrorism 
and even full-scale wars (Andress & Winterfeld, 2011). One demonstration 
was the cyberattacks on Estonia in April and May 2007 by digital activists 
from the Russian diaspora (Herzog, 2011). This resulted in preventing Estonia 
public services from conducting their functions for two weeks. 
Other serious examples are cyber attacking of Iran nuclear power plan by 
the American-Israeli Stuxnet virus in 2010 (Karnouskos, 2011), cyber 
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attacking of the computers of South Korean hydro and nuclear power 
operator suspected by North Korea in 2014, and hacking of Sony Picture 
Entertainment in November, 2014. In this century, threat spectrum becomes 
far more complicated and dangerous than ever. Modern military troops must 
be trained in both basic military operations and insidious cyber threats in 
multidimensional environments. Hence, this paper presents an innovative 
“Cyber Risk Assessment (CRA)” conceptual framework which intends to 
extend the previous Cyber Risk Evaluation (CRE) framework in order to fulfill 
risk assessment standards based on NIST SP 800-115 (NIST, 2008) and ISO 
31000:2009 (ISO, 2009). Military Risk Evaluation (MRE) is presented based 
on Critical Security Metric (Sun, Jajodia, Li, Cheng, Tang, & Singhal, 2010) 
and Network Centric Warfare (NCW) (DOD, 2003). It is also extended to Risk 
Environment (RE) with additional likelihood of occurrence and magnitude 
of impact. In other words, the proposed CRA involves the collection and 
integration of both quantitative and qualitative data. The VD tools in Network 
Risk Evaluation (NRE) were used for the quantitative data collection, and the 
focus group in the MRE (the proposed method) was used to collect qualitative 
data. The outcome is Cyber Risk Assessment in military perspective, which is 
very useful for supporting cyber warfare.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Information and Asset Security have been developed continuously covering 
physical, communication, emission, computer, network, information and 
cyber security. No perfect solution could secure everything at the same 
time. The best security is perhaps to apply all of them together. Our research 
concentrates on the integration of network and information security that lead 
to cybersecurity in military concerns. Many concepts and research articles 
related to cybersecurity, cyber warfare, Network Centric Warfare (NCW), 
social network and SCADA were reviewed.
IT SECURITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT/ASSESSMENT 
STANDARDS
IT security relied on standards, protocols and procedures from numbers of 
vendors and related organizations. Many products from vendors are introduced 
to public companies and government agencies. Vulnerability Detection (VD) 
tools are prominent equipment used for scanning, detecting and analyzing 
vulnerabilities on each host. An important outcome is risk analysis for cyber 
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defense purposes. Security metrics and related standards are background 
features that significantly influence the results of VD tools. In one of our 
previous works (Chimmanee, Veeraprasit, Sriphrew, & Hemanidhi, 2012), we 
compared the scanning performance of two VD tools (NetClarity and Nessus). 
The result showed that each VD tool has unequal ability to detect hosts and 
vulnerabilities. Classification for the risk level of found vulnerabilities are 
also very diversified. The same vulnerability, as specified by the Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures list (The MITRE Corporation, 2017) from the 
U.S. National Vulnerability Database (NVD), detected from different VD tools, 
may be ranged at different risk levels. Thus, we proposed Network Risk Metric 
(NRM) to grade the different results from them (Hemanidhi, Chimmanee, & 
Sanguansat, 2012). In 2014, an additional open-source software-based VD 
tool, Retina, was applied. Unbiased Network Risk Evaluation (NRE) from 
NRM was presented (Hemanidhi, Chimmanee & Sanguansat, 2014). Later, 
with the original idea of “the same network infrastructure may have different 
IT risks depending on its attractive value”, the authors introduced the Risk 
Environment (RE) and the Cyber Risk Evaluation (CRE) framework based 
on military operation, which were compiled from the integration of NRM and 
RE (Hemanidhi, Chimmanee & Kimpan, 2015). This paper presented only 
an abstract idea of the framework. Lastly, isolating from any standard, the 
authors demonstrated two case studies of the CRE framework (Hemanidhi, 
Chimmanee, Sanguansat & Nuchampun, 2015). Summary of previous 
works and literature reviews about IT security, Vulnerability Analysis, Risk 
management/assessment standards, and related articles are briefed in Table 1.
Table 1
Summary of Previous Works and Literature Reviews about IT Security, 
Vulnerability Analysis, Risk Management/Assessment Standards, and Related 
Articles
Domains Topics References Contributions/Explanations
Vulnerability 
analysis
ITU-T X.805 (Cho et al., 2005) Vulnerability analysis method for 
developing security framework of 
NGN infrastructure and services.
Vulnerability 
analysis
CVSS Version 2.0 
(Supersedes CVSS 
v1.0:2004)
(Mell et al., 2007) A complete guide to the CVSS 
Version 2.0, an open framework 
for communicating the 
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Domains Topics References Contributions/Explanations
Risk 
management
Enterprise level IT 
risk management 





Presents a framework that 
organizes IT risks into five 
categories: infrastructure 
development and support, 
operations and maintenance of 
business process, office level 
support, software development, 
and outsourcing management.
IT security ISO/IEC 
27004:2009











design for diagnosis 
of web-based 
vulnerabilities
(Subramanian  et 
al., 2009)
Proves that appropriate metrics 
are needed to grade the various 
vulnerabilities from different 
scanners.
IT security ISO/IEC 
27003:2010
(ISO/IEC, 2010) ISMS implementation guidance




(Sun et al., 2010) Security metric collection, 
management, and visualization for 
scalable and automatic security 
analysis. Four critical metrics are 









(Loh et al., 2010) Metrics for web application 
scanner assessment and 
vulnerability reporting.
Table 1
Summary of Previous Works and Literature Reviews about IT Security, 
Vulnerability Analysis, Risk Management/Assessment Standards, and Related 
Articles 
Domains Topics References Contributions/Explanations
IT security Security metrics:
A brief survey
(Purboyo et al., 
2011)
Identifies many open 
problems in security metrics 
area.
(continued)
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Domains Topics References Contributions/Explanations













detection on Rangsit 
university network
(Veeraprasit et al., 
2012)
Compares performance of 
hardware-based and software-
based vulnerability detection 





comparison of VD 
between NetClarity 




Compares performance of 
two VD tools in 3 categories: 
searching ability, scanning 
time and the ability of 
detection.
IT security and 
risk management
COBIT 5 (ISACA, 2012) A business framework for the 
governance and management 
of enterprise IT.
Risk management NIST SP 800-30rev1 
(Revision 1)
(NIST, 2012) Guidance for conducting 
risk assessment of federal 
information systems and 
organizations.
Risk management Risk evaluation by 
VD tools for IT 
Department of the 
Royal Thai Army
(Hemanidhi et al., 
2012)
Proposed unbiasedly Network 
Risk Evaluation (NRE) to a 
military IT unit.
IT security ISO/IEC 27001:2013 
(Supersedes ISO/IEC 
27001:2005)
(ISO/IEC, 2013) ISMS - Requirements
IT security ISO/IEC 27002:2013 
(Supersedes ISO 
27002:2005)
(ISO/IEC, 2013) Code of practice for 
information security 
management





(Hemanidhi et al., 
2014)
Introduced NRM for grading 
distinctive results of various 
vulnerability detection tools. 
The outcome is an unbiased 
NRE for overall network.
Risk management Cyber Risk 
Evaluation (CRE) 
framework based on 
risk environment of 
military operation
(Hemanidhi et al., 
2015)
Proposed new idea of risk 
evaluation under military 
operation environment. 
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Domains Topics References Contributions/Explanations
IT security ISO/IEC 
27000-Series 
(ISO27k) (4th ed.) 
(Supersedes ISO/IEC 
27000 (3rd ed.):2014)
(ISO/IEC, 2016) ISMS - Overview and 
vocabulary 
*The first standard of this 
series is ISO/IEC 17799:2000
IT security ISO 27799:2016 
(Supersedes ISO 
27799:2008)
(ISO, 2016) Health informatics - 
Information security 
management in health using 
ISO/IEC 27002
NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE (NCW), MILITARY OPERATION 
AND OTHER TOPICS RELATED TO CYBER WARFARE
It is not only the U.S. that is awake about the new form of war in cyberspace 
domain. After the cyberattack on Estonia in April 2007, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) has become a conscious region started to 
prepare for the possibility of forthcoming cyberwar. The Science and 
Technology Committee (STC) of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly have 
continuously managed to conduct conferences on cyber security matter 
since 2009. On November 23, 2014, the STC stated that cyber security is a 
crucial international concern. The STC pointed out the wide divergence of 
cyber security capabilities among their members. Attacking on allies with 
weak cyber security capabilities can lead to severe effects on all nations. The 
NATO defense planning process is developing an integration of cyber defense 
capabilities among their members (Vitel, 2014). In fact, it is hard to demarcate 
the boundary of cyberwar, cyberterrorism, and cybercrime. Ophardt (2010) 
pointed out that cyberwar is challenging the traditional concepts of territory. 
Cyber aggression by non-state collective actors could turn into sociological 
cybercrime or cyberwar. The International Criminal Court (ICC) should be 
part of a solution to address these cyber threats and the new international legal 
framework must consider the power of sociological forces in cyberspace. 
Critical examples of cyber warfare are as follows.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
Traditionally, SCADA is implemented to manage Power/Nuclear Plants. On 
December 22, 2014, the Wall Street Journal reported that computers at South 
Korea’s nuclear-plant operator of the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co Ltd. 
(KHNP) had been hacked since December 15, 2014 (Kwaak, 2014). The 
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U.S. not only accused North Korea for this cyber attack but also the previous 
hacking of the Sony Picture Entertainment earlier in November, 2014. Even 
if these circumstances remain unclear but main digital evidences pointed to 
North Korea, which admitted to forming a hacker team. The U.S. and South 
Korea need to observe North Korea’s cyberwarfare capabilities seriously since 
them. This is a clear example that cyber warfare incidents threaten the national 
security of a state.
Online Social Networks (OSNs)
In the last decade, Thailand was confronted with waves of political difficulties 
that led to tremendous political changes. Social networks have been utilized 
by various groups to gain both tangible and intangible power from human 
assets. The Royal Thai Ministry of Defense is a core executive of the 
Council of Ministers that needs to cooperate with the government to cease 
protestors’ intimidated activities. The Royal Thai Armed Forces found itself 
in a cumbersome status of how to manage the balance between the stability 
of the government and the liberty of the Thai citizens in a democracy. 
Notwithstanding, many websites and networks of the Royal Thai Armed 
Forces became cyber attacking targets (from various groups of protestors) via 
the Internet. 
Thailand has 28 million Facebook users (the 9th position worldwide). Yet 
another 30 million LINE users rank Thailand as the 2nd LINE community 
in the world after Japan. From the Thailand Internet user profile 2015 
(ETDA, 2015), 81.2% of Thai people access the Internet via smart phones 
5.7 hours a day and 82.7% of smart phone use is for communication over 
famous social networks such as Facebook (92.1%) and LINE (85.1%). 
Sharing information through the social media in Thailand is extremely 
quick. Therefore, information operation and cyberwar via social network 
on mobile devices are critical in Thailand. According to Singer (2015), 
ISIS uses the social media as a weapon. Protestors in Thailand use OSNs 
to share information against the government. At any stage, it is possible 
that terrorists could impersonate themselves as members of protestors 
and mislead the group into their courses. Thus, OSNs gain implicit cyber 
power to menace the national security. The contribution of the proposed 
framework is displayed by its capabilities in assessing cyber risk from the 
cognitive and information domains of NCW. Summary of the literature 
review about NCW, Military Operation, and other topics related to cyber 
warfare are in Table 2.
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Table 2
Summary of the Literature Reviews about Network Centric Warfare (NCW), 
Military Operation, and Other Topics Related to Cyber Warfare
Domains Topics References Contributions/Explanations
Military FM 34-130 (DOA, 1994) Intelligence preparation of 
the battlefield. The battlefield 
environment, effects and threat 
evaluation are defined.
Network centric Network Centric 
Warfare (NCW)
(DOD, 2003) Description of NCW and 
its three domains: Physical, 
information and cognitive.
Cyber Cyber warfare 
and the crime of 
aggression
(Ophardt, 2010) The need for individual 




(DOD, 2011) Guidelines for the Armed Forces 
in joint operations across the 
range of military operation. 
3 levels of war are described 
including strategic, operational 
and tactical level.
Cyber Cyber warfare (Andress & 
Winterfeld, 2011)
Techniques, tactics and tools for 
security practitioners.





(Herzog et al., 
2011)
A summation of the cyberattacks 
on Estonia in April and May 
2007 by digital activists.
SCADA Stuxnet worm 





Investigation on the Stuxnet 
worm which could be used as a 
potential cyber weapon targeting 
to attack critical system 
infrastructures, e.g. SCADA.
Military ADRP 3-0 (DOA, 2012) Unified land operations. 
Description of the army 
operational concept and combat 
power.
(continued)
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Domains Topics References Contributions/Explanations
Information 
operation
FM 3-13 (DOA, 2013) Inform and influence activities.  
Information environment is 
described and categorized into 3 
dimensions of NCW.
SCADA The real story of 
Stuxnet [Online]
(Kushner, 2013) Cyber worm designed to modify 
the execution code in PLCs of 
the Siemens SCADA systems.
Cyber Cyber space and 
Euro-Atlantic 
security
(Vitel, 2014) Informing concern of cyber 
threats against all countries 
that rely heavily on computer 
networks and systems.
Table 2
Summary of the Literature Reviews about Network Centric Warfare (NCW), 
Military Operation, and other Topics Related to Cyber Warfare
Domains Topics References Contributions/Explanations
Cyber Joint publication 3-13 
(Incorporating change 1)
(DOD, 2014) Information operations:
Cyberspace is identified as a 
global domain and recognized 
as a new military battlefield.
SCADA South Korea Nuclear 
Plant Operator Hacked 
[Online]
(Kwaak, 2014) Critical cyber attacking that 
threatens the national cyber 
security.
Cyber Cyber risk evaluation 
(CRE) framework for 
network centric warfare
Hemanidhi      et. 
al., 2015)
Introduced CRE that integrates 
risks from NRM and RE 
together. No risk management 
standards are applied.
SCADA NIST SP 800-82rev2 
(Revision 2)
(NIST, 2015) Guide to Industrial Control 
Systems (ICS) security 
including SCADA Systems
OSNs Terror on twitter: How 
ISIS is taking war to 
social media and social 
media is fighting back
(Singer et al., 2015) OSNs as potential weapons for 
terrorist.
SCADA A review of cyber 
security risk assessment 




Twenty-four risk assessment 
methods developed for or 
applied in the context of a 
SCADA system.
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PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
This paper presents a novel conceptual framework called “Cyber Risk 
Assessment (CRA)” which applied the mixed research method as explained 
by Creswell (2014). This framework was vertically divided into 2 major parts: 
Network Risk Evaluation (NRE) and Military Risk Evaluation (MRE). In the 
first part, quantitative data from NRE was analyzed from the vulnerability 
scanning of various VD tools using the testing and examination methodology. 
In the second part, qualitative data from MRE was gathered from discussions 
of military professionals and IT/Cyber specialists using the focus group 
methodology. Full details of this research methodology are described in the 
next section. This framework was designed with respect to the ISO 31000:2009 
standard, therefore, both NRE and MRE were horizontally differentiated into 
3 phases including cyber risk identification, cyber risk analysis, and cyber 
risk evaluation. The entire conceptual CRA framework is shown in Figure 1. 
Quantitative data from NRE is the upper part while qualitative data from MRE 
is the lower part.
Figure 1.  Cyber risk assessment (CRA) conceptual framework.
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Figure 2.  Network risk evaluation (NRE) concept.
PART 1: NETWORK RISK EVALUATION (NRE)
As mentioned above, each major part will be separated into 3 phases including 
cyber risk identification, analysis and evaluation. The general concept of NRE 
is shown in Figure 2.
NRE Phase 1: Cyber Risk Identification
Basically, risk identification is to identify risks from the sources, targets, 
events, causes and potential consequences. It would include identification of 
assets, threats, existing controls, vulnerabilities and consequences. There are 
several types of vulnerabilities, for instance, vulnerabilities from the strategic 
level (policy, plan, procedure, and so on), human vulnerability (training, 
awareness, responsibilities, and so on), vulnerabilities from techniques and 
physical vulnerabilities. In the first phase of NRE, we focused on technical 
vulnerability identification because it is the most prominent technique that 
many organizations choose to scan their networks and vulnerabilities of 
each host. It consists of two factors: location and tools as shown in Figure 
2. Location represents the network where several VD tools are implemented. 
Tools are types of vulnerability detection, e.g. NetClarity, Nessus and Retina. 
The main purpose of this phase was to identify hosts and their vulnerabilities.
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NRE Phase 2: Cyber Risk Analysis
In this phase, scanning results from phase 1, including the number of found 
hosts and vulnerabilities of each host, were graded through a mathematical 
algorithm called “Network Risk Metric (NRM). NRM was proposed for non-
biased network risk evaluation of the overall network from various VD tools. 
The outcomes of the NRM were inputs for NRE in the cyber risk evaluation 
phase. Note that, from our perspective, types of network equipment have 
different levels of attraction to attackers. In this article, only generic ideas 
and algorithms are addressed by the following Eq. (1-5). Full explanation and 
examples of NRM can be found in our previous article at IEEE ACDT 2015 
publication (Hemanidhi et al., 2014).
Differentiate Server-Client Risk
There were 5 steps in this phase. We differentiated computers of the network 
into two groups: server (s) and client (c). More groups are possible depending 
on classification of the network administrator. The “Cut-off” value f to limit 
diffusion of data was calculate from Eq. (1).
                              (1) 
where L is the number of risk level,                         , and ni,l is 
number (value) of detected vulnerabilities in each risk level l. Four risk levels 
identified by NetClarity were applied including low, medium, high and serious/
critical. Definition of each risk level can be found in the NACwall appliances 
user guide (NetClarity, 2011). Then we normalized all detected vulnerabilities 
of each risk level by appropriate cut-offs. The new “Cut-off Normalize Table” 
was then created from Eq. (2) as follows,
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Then,        and        was weighted by weighted value (    ) in which L = {Serious(4), High(3), Medium(2), Low(1)}. The new weighted value of 
vulnerability for each server host        and client host       was derived from 
Eq. (3) as follows:













        (1)  
where L is the number of risk level, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑠𝑠),𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑐𝑐)}, and ni,l is number (value) of detected 
vulnerabilities in each risk l vel . Four risk levels identified by NetClarity were applied including 
low, medium, high and serious/critical. Definition of each risk level can be found in the NACwall 
appliances user guide (NetClarity, 2011). Then we normalized all detected vulnerabilities of each risk 
level by appropriate cut-offs. The new “Cut-off Normalize Table” was then created from Eq. (2) as 
follows, 
                                             (2) 
Then, )(,
s




lin  was weighted by weighted value ( L ) in which L = {Serious(4), High(3), 
Medium(2), Low(1)}. The new weighted value of vulnerability for each server host ?́?𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙
(𝑠𝑠) and client host 
?́?𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐)  was derived from Eq. (3) as follows: 






li nn        (3) 
The outcome was the new weighted value of vulnerability for each group. The new “Weighted 
Normalized Table” was then created. The normalized risk for server 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
(𝑠𝑠) and client 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
(𝑐𝑐) was 
calculated from Eq. (4). 















nR     (4) 
The relative risk for server group and client group ( csR , ) was estimated from Eq. (5). 











,       (5) 
These relative risks were initial values to evaluate the mean of overall risk for each type of host. 
 
NRE Phase 3: Cyber Risk Evaluation 
 
Finally, in the last phase of NRE, products from NRM were graded through Eq. (6-8). The neutral risk 













        (1)  
where L is the number of risk level, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑠𝑠),𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑐𝑐)}, and ni,l is number (value) of detected 
vulnerabilities in each risk level l. Four risk levels identified by NetClarity were applied including 
low, medium, high and serious/critical. Definition of each risk level can be found in the NACwall 
appliances user guide (NetClarity, 2011). Then we normalized all detected vulnerabilities of each risk 
level by appropriate cut-offs. The new “Cut-off Normalize Table” was then created from Eq. (2) as 
follows, 
                                             (2) 
Then, )(,
s




lin  was weighted by weighted value ( L ) in which L = {Serious(4), High(3), 
Medium(2), Low(1)}. The new weighted value of vulnerability for each server host ?́?𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙
(𝑠𝑠) and client host 
?́?𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐)  was derived from Eq. (3) as follows: 






li nn        (3) 
The outcome was the new weighted value of vulnerability for each group. The new “Weighted 
Normalized Table” was then created. The normalized risk for server 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
(𝑠𝑠) and client 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
(𝑐𝑐) was 
calculated from Eq. (4). 















nR     (4) 
The relative risk for server group and client group ( csR , ) was estimated from Eq. (5). 











,       (5) 
These relative risks were initial values to evaluate the mean of overall risk for each type of host. 
 
NRE Phase 3: Cyber Risk Evaluation 
 
Finally, in the last phase of NRE, products from NRM were graded through Eq. (6-8). The neutral risk 













        (1)  
where L is the number of risk level, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑠𝑠),𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑐𝑐)}, and ni,l is number (value) of detected 
vulnerabilities in each risk level l. Four risk levels identified by NetClarity were applied including 
low, medium, high and serious/critical. Definition of each risk level can be found in the NACwall 
appliances user guide (NetClarity, 2011). Then we normalized all detected vulnerabilities of each risk 
level by appropriate cut-offs. The new “Cut-off Normalize Table” was then created from Eq. (2) as 
follows, 
                                             (2) 
Then, )(,
s




lin  was weighted by weighted value ( L ) in which L = {Serious(4), High(3), 
Medium(2), Low(1)}. The new weighted value of vulnerability for each server host ?́?𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙
(𝑠𝑠)
?́?𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐)  was derived from Eq. (3) as follows: 






li nn        (3) 
The outcome was the new weighted value of vulnerability for each group. The new “Weighted 
Normalized Table” was then created. The normalized risk for server 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
(𝑠𝑠) and client 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
(𝑐𝑐) was 
calculated from Eq. (4). 















nR     (4) 
The relative risk for server group and client group ( csR , ) was estimated from Eq. (5). 











,       (5) 
These relative risks were initial values to evaluate the mean of overall risk for each type of host. 
 
NRE Phase 3: Cyber Risk Evaluation 
 
Finally, in the last phase of NRE, products from NRM were graded through Eq. (6-8). The neutral risk 













        (1)  
where L is the number of risk level, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑠𝑠),𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑐𝑐)}, and ni,l is number (value) of detected 
vulnerabilities in each risk level l. Four risk levels identified by NetClarity were applied including 
low, medium, high and serious/critical. Definition of each risk level can be found in the NACwall 
appliances user guide (NetClarity, 2011). Then we normalized all detected vulnerabilities of each risk 
level by appropriate cut-offs. The new “Cut-off Normalize Table” was then created from Eq. (2) as 
follows, 
                                             (2) 
Then, )(,
s




lin  was weighted by weighted value ( L ) in which L = {Serious(4), High(3), 
Medium(2), Low(1)}. The new weighted value of vulnerability for each server host ?́?𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙
(𝑠𝑠) and client host 
?́?𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐)  was derived from Eq. (3) as follows: 






li nn       (3) 
The outcome was the new eighted value of vulnerability for each group. The new “Weighted 
Normalized Table” was then created. The normalized risk for server 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
(𝑠𝑠) and client 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
(𝑐𝑐) was 
calculated from Eq. (4). 















nR     (4) 
The relative risk for server group and client group ( csR , ) was estimated from Eq. (5). 











,       (5) 
These relative risks were initial values to evaluate the mean of overall risk for each type of host. 
 
NRE Phase 3: Cyber Risk Evaluation 
 
Finally, in the last phase of NRE, products from NRM were graded through Eq. (6-8). The neutral risk 













        (1)  
where L is the number of risk level, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑠𝑠),𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑐𝑐)}, and ni,l is number (value) of detected 
vulnerabilities in each risk level l. Four risk levels identified by NetClarity were applied including 
low, medium, high and serious/crit cal. Definition of each risk level can be found in the NACwall 
appliances user guide (NetClarity, 2011). Then we normalized all detected vulnerabilities of each risk 
level by appropriate cut-offs. The new “Cut-off Normalize Table” was then created from Eq. (2) as 
follows, 
                                             (2) 
 )(,
s




lin  as  weighted value ( L ) in which L = {Serious(4), High(3), 
Medium(2), Low(1)}. The new weighted value of vulnerability for each server host ?́?𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙
(𝑠𝑠) and client host 
?́?𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙
𝑐𝑐)  was derived from Eq. (3) as follows: 






li nn        (3) 
The outcome was the new weighted value of vulnerability for each group. The new “Weighted 
Normalized Table” was then created. The normalized risk for server 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
(𝑠𝑠) and client 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
(𝑐𝑐) was 
calculated from Eq. (4). 















nR     (4) 
The relative risk for server group and client group ( csR , ) was estimated from Eq. (5). 











,      (5) 
These relative risks were initial values to evaluate the mean of overall risk for each type of host. 
 
NRE Phase 3: Cyber Risk Evaluation 
 
Finally, in the last phase of NRE, products from NRM were graded through Eq. (6-8). The neutral risk 













        (1)  
where L is the number of risk level, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑠𝑠),𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑐𝑐)}, and ni,l is number (value) of detected 
vulnerabilities in each risk level l. Four risk levels identified by NetClarity were applied including 
low, medium, high and serious/critical. Definition of each risk level can be found in the NACwa l 
appliances user guide (NetClarity, 2011). Then we normalized a l detected vulnerabilities of each risk 
level by appropriate cut-o fs. The new “Cut-o f Normalize Table” was then created from Eq. (2) as 
fo lows, 
     (2) 
Then, )(,
s




lin eighted by weighted value ( L ) in w ich L = {Serious(4), High(3), 
edium(2), Low(1)}. The new weighted value of vulnerability for each server host ?́?𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙
(𝑠𝑠) and client host 
?́?𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐)  was derived from Eq. (3) as fo lows: 






li nn        (3) 
The outcome was the new weighted value of vulnerability for each group. The new “ eighted 
Normalized Table” was then created. The normalized risk for server 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
(𝑠𝑠) and client 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
(𝑐𝑐) was 
















nR     (4) 
The relative risk for server group and client group ( csR , ) was estimated from Eq. (5). 











,      (5) 
These relative risks were initial values to evaluate the mean of overa l risk for each type of host. 
 
NRE Phase 3: Cyber Risk Evaluation 
Fina ly, in the last phase of NRE, products from NR  were graded through Eq. (6-8). The neutral risk 













        (1)  
wher  L is the number of risk lev l, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑠𝑠),𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑐𝑐)}, and ni,l is number (value) of detected 
vulnerabilities in each risk lev l l. Four risk lev ls identified by NetClarity were ap lied including 
low, medium, high and serious/critical. Definition of each risk lev l can be found in the NACwall 
ap liances user guide (NetClarity, 201 ). Then we normalized all detected vulnerabilities of each risk 
lev l by ap ropriate cut-offs. The new “Cut-off Normalize Table” was then created from Eq. (2) as 
foll ws, 
                                             (2) 
Then, )(,
s




lin  was weighted by weighted value ( L ) in hich L = {Serious(4), High(3), 
Medium(2), Low(1)}. The new eighted value of vulnerability for each server host ?́?𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙
(𝑠𝑠) and client host 
?́?𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐)  was derived from Eq. (3) as foll ws: 






li nn        (3) 
The outcome was the new weighted value of vulnerability for each group. The new “Weighted 
Normalized Table” was then created. The normalized risk for server 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
(𝑠𝑠) and client 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
(𝑐𝑐) was 
calculated from Eq. (4). 















nR     (4) 
The r lative risk for server group and client group ( csR , ) was estimated from Eq. (5). 











,       (5) 
Thes  r lative risk  wer  initial values to evaluate the mean of verall risk for each type of host. 
 
NRE Phase 3: Cyber Risk Evaluation 
 
Finally, in the last phase of NRE, products from NRM wer  grade  through Eq. (6-8). The neutral risk 













        (1)  
where L is the number of risk level, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑠𝑠),𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑐𝑐)}, and ni,l is number (value) of detected 
vulnerabilities in each risk level l. Four risk levels identified by NetClarity were applied including 
low, medium, high and serious/critical. Definition of each risk level can be found in the NACwall 
applia ces user guide (NetClarity, 2011). Then we normalized all detected vulnerabilities of each risk 
level by appropriate cut-offs. The new “Cut-off Normalize Table” was then created from Eq. (2) as 
follows, 
                                             (2) 
Then, )(,
s




lin  was weighted by weighted value ( L ) in which L = {Serious(4), High(3), 
M dium(2), Low(1)}. The new weighted value of vulnerability for each server host ?́?𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙
(𝑠𝑠) and client host 
?́?𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐)  was eriv d fr  Eq. (3) as follows: 






li nn        (3) 
The outcome was the new weighted value of vulnerability for each group. The new “Weighted 
Normalized Table” was then created. The normalized risk for server 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
(𝑠𝑠) and client 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
(𝑐𝑐) was 
c lculated from Eq. (4). 















nR     (4) 
The relative risk for server group and client group ( csR , ) was estimated from Eq. (5). 











,       (5) 
These relative risks were initial values to evaluate the mean of overall risk for each type of host. 
 
NRE Phase 3: Cyber Risk Evaluation 
 
Finally, in the last phase of NRE, products from NRM were graded through Eq. (6-8). The neutral risk 













        (1)  
where L is the nu ber f ri 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(𝑠𝑠),𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑐𝑐)} i,l i  number (value) of detected 
lnerabilities in each risk l vel l. Fo r risk levels identified by NetClarity were applied i cluding 
l , edium, high and serious/critical. Def niti n of each risk level can be found in the NACwall 
a pliances user guide (NetClarity, 2011). Then we normalized all detected vulnerabilities of each risk 
level by appropriate cut-offs. The new “Cut-off Normalize Table” was then created from Eq. (2) as 
follows, 
                                             (2) 
Then, )(,
s




lin  was weighted by weighted value ( L ) in which L = {Serious(4), High(3), 
Medium(2), Low(1)}. The new weighted value of vulnerability for each server host ?́?𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙
(𝑠𝑠) and client host 
?́?𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙
(𝑐𝑐)  as derived from Eq. (3) as follows: 






li nn       (3) 
The outcome was the new weighted value of vulnerability for each group. The new “Weighted 
Normalized Table” was then created. The normaliz d risk for server 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
(𝑠𝑠) and client 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
(𝑐𝑐) was 
calculated from Eq. (4). 















nR     (4) 
The relativ  risk for server group and client gr up ( csR , ) was estimated from Eq. (5). 











,       (5) 
These relative risks were initial values to evaluate the mean of overall risk for each type of host. 
 
NRE Phase 3: Cyber Risk Evaluation 
 
Finally, in the last phase of NRE, products from NRM were graded through Eq. (6-8). The neutral risk 
evaluation from various VD tools was invited. The first step of this phase was to find the “Probability 
Journal of ICT, 16, No. 2 (Dec) 2017, pp: 192–222
205
The outcome was the new weighted value of vulnerability for each group. The 
new “Weighted Normalized Table” was then created. The normalized risk for 
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NRE Phase 3: Cyber Risk Evaluation
Finally, in the last phase of NRE, products from NRM were graded through 
Eq. (6-8). The neutral risk evaluation from various VD tools was invited. 
The first step of this phase was to find the “Probability of Trust”,       , 
which is related to the ratio of the detected host’s type. Its simple equation is 
shown in Eq. (6).
               (6)
Then we offered the “Possibility of Risk”, P(R)i,j, which detected those 
vulnerabilities that might be exploited. This was made by applying the 
“Probability of trust” to the relative risk of the server and the client as shown 
in Eq. (7).
             (7)
Finally, the “Total estimated risk”, for each type of host, in percentage, was 
calculated by adding all possibilities of risk together as shown in Eq. (8).
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Then we offered the “Possibility of Risk”, jiRP ,)( , which detected those vulnerabilities that might be 
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The total estimated risk represents the final overall risk for each type of host 
from our proposed “Network Risk Metric (NRM)”. This is our “Network Risk 
Evaluation (NRE)” which is not biased to any vendor or standard institution.
PART 2: MILITARY RISK EVALUATION (MRE)
To evaluate risk in the military perspective, it is important to understand the 
basic background of military operation and its related topics. In the Cyberwar 
and the NCW concept (DOD, 2003), there were 5 war-fighting domains 
including land, sea (maritime), air, space and cyberspace. The first four 
domains could be considered as physical domains since military objects could 
be specified by location, direction, distance, weight, size, and so on. However, 
the fifth domain, cyberspace, is a global domain within the information 
environment comprising the interdependent network of information technology 
infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunication networks, computer 
systems and embedded processors and controllers (Andress & Winterfeld, 
2011). This domain is very extensive covering both physical and logical 
factors. Theories, strategies, doctrines and tactics that shape the domain and 
cyberwar are really needed. The general concept of MRE is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3.  Military risk evaluation (MRE) concept.
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MRE Phase 1: Cyber Risk Identification (Military Risk Factor: MRF)
In the first phase of MRE, Cyber Risk Identification, risk factors and their 
related consequences subjected to military operation must be identified. To 
obtain this information, in-depth interviewing with military professionals and 
information security specialists are motivated. The outcome is called “Military 
Risk Factors (MRF)” which could send significant affects to military cyber 
warfare. Contents of MRF are categorized and filled into an appropriate cell 
of the crossed table between NCW domains and criticality in security metric. 
Four criteria of criticality in security metric (Sun et al., 2010) including service, 
location, role and asset lie in rows. Three key domains of NCW (DOD, 2003), 
including physical, information and cognitive are in columns. The contents of 
MRF are shown in Table 3.
Table 3
Military Risk Factor (MRF) from Critical Security Metric and Network 


































Doctrine, tactics, knowledge, 
experience, etc.
MRE Phase 2: Cyber Risk Analysis (Risk Environment: RE) 
The second phase of MRE, from ISO 31000:2009 (ISO/IEC, 2009), each 
risk incident based on MRF from the first phase was scored based on their 
likelihood of occurrence and magnitude of impact. Firstly, the focus group, 
composed of military/NCW professionals and IT/Cyber specialists, was 
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motivated. Secondly, each risk incident was rearranged into a 3x4 table 
called “Risk Environment” (RE) matrix as shown in Figure 4. Note that, 
the RE matrix has the same structure of the MRF table in which 4 criteria 
of criticality in security metric lie in rows while 3 domains of information 
environment in the NCW are in columns. Lastly, the focus group discussed 
each incident in details and quoted the score of each incident applied with the 
risk level in Table 5. For example, if we want to analyze risk environment of 
a military network affected by the public electric service infrastructure in a 
state of cyberwar, within the Location-Physical cell, the risk level would be 
analyzed from likelihood and impact if related the land location of electric 
plants is physically attacked. Risk Environment subjected to the MRF was 
considered under the likelihood of occurrence and the magnitude of impact. 
More explanations about RE Matrix and risk level are as follows.
Figure 4.  Risk environment (RE) matrix subjected to likelihood of 
occurrence and magnitude of impact.
For each incident, relevant vulnerabilities and their corresponding threats were 
considered. The appropriate row was identified by the risk environment impact 
while the column was identified by the likelihood of the threat incident. Table 
4 is for mapping MRF with the likelihood of occurrence and the magnitude of 
impact against RE.
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Table 4
Likelihood and Impact on Risk Environment (RE)
















Normal (0) 0 1 2 3 4
Low (1) 1 2 3 4 5
Medium (2) 2 3 4 5 6
High (3) 3 4 5 6 7
Very High (4) 4 5 6 7 8
Each risk result was measured on a scale of 0 to 8 that was evaluated against the 
risk acceptance criteria. It was mapped to the overall risk rating as described 
in Table 5.
Table 5




Less important impacted environment – no unusual activity exists beyond 
the normal concern or no damage to the network centric domain, i.e. normal 
probing of the network, low risk viruses.
Low
(2)
Slightly more important than a low-level impacted environment. The potential 
exists for malicious cyber activities. No significant impact has occurred.
Medium
(3-5)
Significant risk due to increased hacking, virus, or other malicious activity in 
cyber environment which compromises systems or diminishes service. For 
example, important vulnerability that may be easy to exploit and allow an 
attacker to cause serious damage to the network. Significant impacts could 
happen within the cyber environment of NCW.
High
(6)
High risk of increased hacking, virus or other malicious cyber activity which 
targets or compromises core infrastructure, causes multiple service outages, 
multiple system compromises or compromises critical infrastructure. High 





Severe risk of hacking, virus or other malicious activity resulting in wide-
spread outages and/or significantly destructive compromises to systems 
with no known remedy or debilitates one or more critical infrastructure 
sectors. Severe level or wide spread level of damage or disruption of critical 
infrastructure assets. Severe impacts to the cyber environment of NCW.
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MRE Phase 3: Cyber Risk Evaluation
From the previous cyber risk analysis phase, scoring of risk incidents in RE 
Matrix was evaluated in 2 steps. The first one was to find the average of all 
available REs from each domain (column) of the NCW. Was possible that the 
scoring value of some cells in the RE matrix remain “NIL” rather than “Zero”. 
The second step was to find the mean of all three results from the first step. 
Let RE be an m x n matrix in which m represents 4 members of the critical 
security metrics and n represents 3 members of the NCW. Therefore, RE is a 
3 x 4 matrix by nature. The definition of RE matrix is defined with Eq. (9).
             (9)
In the first stage, the average of each NCW domains (avj) was calculated from 
Eq. (10).
                       (10)
  
MRE is the mean of the three NCW domains from the second stage as shown 
in Eq. (11).
           (11)
Finally, the Cyber Risk Evaluation (CRE) is the mean between the NRE 
and MRE. It should be noted that, although NRM and RE were evaluated 
separately, their outcomes were integrated in the CRE phase for the concluding 
result. NRM was evaluated by a mathematical equation called NRE. RE was 
evaluated from the average of risk levels from the likelihood of occurrence 
and magnitude of impact from the cyber risk analysis phase.
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; and 𝐿𝐿 = |{𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑦𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅, 𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟}| = 3 
In the first stage, the average of each NCW domains (avj) was calculated from Eq. (10). 
   𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗 = (1𝑅𝑅) ∗∑ (𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗)
𝑚𝑚
𝑆𝑆=1
 where 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿   (10) 
   ; l = |𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗| where 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆,𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 
MRE is the mean of the three NCW domains from the second stage as shown in Eq. (11). 
MRE = (1𝐿𝐿) ∗ ∑ (𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘)
𝐿𝐿
𝑘𝑘=1       (11) 
; 𝑘𝑘 ∈ {𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑦𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅, 𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑟} 
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METHODOLOGY
This research used the mixed-method approaches by procedures of the 
overall purposed framework. It is the integration of quantitative data using 
the Vulnerability Assessment (VA) from NRE (previous proposed study) and 
quantitative data using the focus group from MRE which is the proposed 
method in this article. Three methods were used to gather the outcome of each 
major step: (a) experiment, (b) in-depth interview, and (c) focus groups.
Quantitative Methodology: Experiment
In our previous work, NRE was collected from two former phases, 
identification and analysis. These was done by applying a real experiment to 
the target networks. In NIST SP 800-115 (NIST, 2008), there are three types of 
information security assessment methods including testing, examination and 
interviewing. In the identification phase, VD tools were connected to test all 
target networks for hosts and vulnerabilities scanning. In the analysis phase, 
testing outcome from the first phase was examined by NRM and a series of 
mathematical equations which were already notified in our previous work. In 
short, quantitative methodology from experimental designs (Creswell, 2014, 
P.41) were used to evaluate network risk by applying network testing and the 
examination approach (NIST, 2008). 
Qualitative Methodology: Best Practice with In-Depth Interviewing and 
Focus Group
To evaluate military risk in cyber warfare, the qualitative method is more 
suitable for data inquiry. Two approaches of qualitative methodologies were 
selected.
Standard and Best Practice Review with In-Depth Interviewing
Many standards, best practices, and military publications related to information 
and cyber security were reviewed. The initial framework was designed with 
the integration of the NCW concept. Afterwards, in-depth interviewing with 
groups of military specialists who have knowledge in Information/Cyber 
System Security, NCW, and CW were employed. The interview session took 
place at the Royal Thai Army HQ, Bangkok, Thailand, in September 2014. 
It took three hours approximately. The moderator scoped topics to match the 
research objectives in NCW and CW. The participants quoted comments and 
discussed in detail openly. The summary of the knowledge from in-depth 
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interviewing was used to update the major contents in the initial framework, 
as shown in Table 6. The proposed framework is the outcome of the review of 
the articles and the in-depth interview.
Table 6
Phases, Questions, Quoted Comments and Topics




How could we 
identify cyber 
threats?
From many factors that depended on 
sources and events, e.g. Critical Security 
Metrics, NCW, CW, military factors, etc. 
Military risk 
factors (MRF)
What are the 
military risks in 
cyberspace?
Any figure and action that could affect 
military operations in cyberspace (every 






How could we 
integrate these 
complex data for 
analyzing?
Concentrate on analyzing military risks 
in Network Centric Warfare (NCW) 







be the most 
appropriate way 
to analyze these 
contents?
Some ideas of risk management standard 
would do. Here is ISO 31000:2009. 
Likelihood/Impact for each military risk 






How could we 
evaluate results 
from the analysis?
Total score of each cell in RE Matrix will 




In the identification phase, threat sources and related environment, known 
as Military Risk Factors (MRF), were defined. Afterwards, they were 
rearranged and placed in the most appropriate cell of the RE matrix for 
analyzing. Significant contents on the corresponding risk acceptance criteria 
were initiated as shown in Table 3 of the proposed framework section. In the 
analysis phase, the likelihood of occurrence and the magnitude of impact for 
the corresponding contents in RE Metric were voted on a scale as explained in 
Figure 4. In this in-depth interviewing, the specialists agreed to measure the 
likelihood of occurrence and the magnitude of impact from 0 to 4 (normal to 
very high) as specified in Table 4.  Then, the risk level was scaled from 0 to 8 
as described in Table 5. Note that, the likelihood of occurrence, the magnitude 
of impact, and the risk level, could be defined as appropriate to the state of the 
Journal of ICT, 16, No. 2 (Dec) 2017, pp: 192–222
213
cyber environment concerned. Finally, in the evaluation phase, each domain 
of the NCW (Physical, Information, and Cognitive), subsequent to the critical 
risk metrics, was calculated through Eq. (9-11). The outcome of the military 
evaluation phase the Military Risk Evaluation (MRE). Hence, MRE and NRE 
from the network risk evaluation can be merged together mathematically. 
The mean value between MRE and NRE is Cyber Risk Evaluation (CRE) as 
explained in the previous section.
 
Focus Group
To implement this framework, two case studies were demonstrated: (a) 
affected from social network in Thailand and (b) affected from SCADA attack 
(Electricity) in Thailand. Quantitative methodology the was applied to the 
target network for the NRE. Then qualitative methodology using the focus 
group was deployed for the MRE. Experimental results are explained in the 
next section.
PARTICIPATION AND SAMPLING
9 specialists from government and non-government organizations participated 
in this study as shown in Figure 5. All of them had good background in IT/
Cyber Security, and strong knowledge in specific areas related to the research 
objectives as listed in Table 7.
Table 7
Participations in Specific Domain for the Focus Group Study of Cyber Risk 
Assessment (CRA) Conceptual Framework









Year Skill** Year Skill** Year Skill** Year Skill** Year Skill**
Military Officials
P1 5 2 5 2 10 3 2 2 5 3
P2 5 2 5 3 10 4 3 3 5 4
P3 10 4 7 3 10 5 4 3 10 4
P4 5 3 5 2 7 3 2 2 7 4
P5 10 3 5 3 7 3 3 3 7 3
(continued)
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Year Skill** Year Skill** Year Skill** Year Skill** Year Skill**
Police Officials
P6 5 3 7 5 2 2 2 2 5 4
P7 3 3 5 5 2 2 2 2 5 4
Civilians
P8 15 4 2 3 4 3 3 5 10 4
P9 20 4 10 2 2 2 20 5 10 3
Note. * In this paper, specific domains are SCADA and Social network.
          ** Skill: 5 = Excellent, 4 = Good, 3 = Median, 2 = Satisfactory, and 1 = Poor.
          *** P = Participant
Developing Questions
Well-known standards and best practices in information security and Enterprise 
Risk Management (ERM), e.g. ISO/IEC Series, NIST Series, COBIT 5 (ISACA, 
2012), and COSO (Steinberg, Everson, Marten, & Nottingham, 2004), were 
seen to obtain questions for critical risk metrics. Military publications related 
to NCW and CW, e.g. Field Manual (FM) and Joint Publications (JP), were 
used to shape the general information security into military-based cyber 
security. The aims of developing questions were to guide and implicate the 
focus group with the research objective, and to stimulate discussion among 
them. Two significant outcomes from the questionnaire were then (a) to 
identify risks in cyberspace from multi dimensions and (b) to analyze cyber 
risks (likelihood and impact) and how they could affect national security in 
the military perspective. Examples of questions are shown in Table 8.
Table 8






What are the 
critical risks 
to the SCADA 
system, in terms 




center of the SCADA 
network cannot 
maintain regular 
connection with its end-
points, i.e. PLC, IED, 
RTU, etc.
Military’s IT unit 
cannot maintain its 
Data Center (DC) and 





electricity, the power 
supply of the DC could 
prolong just for system 











What are the 
critical risks 
to the SCADA 
system, in terms 





fraud. Endpoints of 
some SCADA sites 
might be tapped from 
attackers and could not 
communicate properly 
with the Distributed 
Control Server (DCS).
Military units in 
coincidental areas 




The military C4I 
system is not in full 
control. Nevertheless, 
the core system is still 
functioning. Another 
communication network 
could compensate this 
risk in a level.
RL02
What are the 
critical risks 
to the SCADA 
system, in terms 





on the on-going 
military operation, e.g. 
command and control 
system.
Military network 
could not support 




Command and control 




between the HQ and 
front-line base is a 
crucial damage. 
RR03
Note. * The Military Technology Center Network
** Code: RS = Risk of Service, RL = Risk of Location, RR = Risk of Role, RA = Risk 
of Assets
Moderating
The focus group session was held in Bangkok, Thailand, in October 2015. 
A short briefing about cyber/information security, Network Centric Warfare 
(NCW), and Cyber Warfare (CW) was introduced in the beginning, followed by 
the significance of risk analysis and the proposed CRA conceptual framework. 
Two case studies, including Social Network and SCADA, were raised for 
cyber risk assessment. Risk incidents from the Cyber Risk Identification 
phase were investigated and amended. All risk incidents were scored based 
on their likelihood of occurrence and the magnitude of impact. Military Risk 
Evaluation (MRE) of both case studies were finally evaluated and integrated 
with Network Risk Evaluation (NRE) as designed by the proposed Cyber Risk 
Assessment (CRA) framework. This focus group interviewing was recorded 
on audio tape recorder to be transcribed later. The authors of this article are 
moderators and note takers of the focus group. Details of the case studies 
in SCADA and OSNs are way beyond this article. Therefore, they will be 
discoursed in future work.
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Figure 5. Focus group on military based cyber risk assessment (CRA) 
framework for supporting cyber warfare in Thailand.
DISCUSSION ON FRAMEWORK
This article has demonstrated and proved that the proposed framework is 
suitable and covers all three domains of the Network Centric Warfare, namely 
physical, information and cognitive. Additionally, it is beneficial to the 
military strategy and systematic to all three levels of war in joint operations 
as described in Joint Publication 3-0 (DOD, 2011), including the Strategic, 
Operational and Tactical levels. 
In the strategic level, the national cyber security community could utilize this 
framework as an innovative cyber risk assessment for full-scale national cyber 
risk management standard without lack of ICT perspectives from military 
services. The Royal Thai Ministry of Defense has recognized cyberspace as a 
military battlefield since 2015. This is the first cyber risk assessment framework 
proposed for national cyber security in the military perspective. In the 
operational level, ICT professionals, military experts and research communities 
can jointly learn about national cyber risks. Focus group discussion to identify 
and analyze cyber risks is an example of this collaboration. The outcome is 
best practices to secure ICT and cyber operation. This could be a great step to 
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enhance the cyber security rules and regulations of intermediate organizations 
responsible to the national cyber security globally. In the tactical/social 
level, subordinators and individuals will be aware of these dreadful threats 
through cyber security rules and regulation. ICT security baselines and/or 
guidelines should be provided to all members at this stage. They will learn 
how to use their ICT equipment properly and securely. Note that, military 
equipment, including vehicles, radars, and weapon systems, are commanded 
and controlled via ICT network infrastructure. Unlike basic ICT equipment 
in the data center, they are abandoned from famous ISMS standards because 
of their indirect impact on the business continuity. With the coming stream 
of cyber warfare, ISMS standards with military concerns must be seriously 
operated with respect to the NCW concept. This is a real critical circumstance 
for overall national cyber security which this proposed framework is designed 
with military concerns based on NCW.
CONCLUSION
IT security is very significant nowadays. Information is one of the most 
valuable properties that needs to be managed securely and effectively. Many 
information security and risk management standards are offered to provide 
procedures for the information system security of the organization. Risk 
assessment plays its crucial role as a core process in risk management. However, 
the thrill of dangerous cyber operation is growing continuously. Cyberspace 
was recognized as a new military battlefield in 2014. Cyberwar has become a 
new influential threat to national security. Unfortunately, current IT security 
and risk management standards are desired for general perspectives, especially 
for business continuity, rather than national security. Not only specific IT risk 
management standard, but also IT risk assessment methodology, is directly 
scoped for military operation. Therefore, this paper proposed an innovative 
idea of cyber risk assessment to improve national cyber security with specific 
intention to deliberate cyber warfare that could affect military operations. 
Activities on this logical domain can send significant impacts to actual the 
physical domain. The threat spectrum has also expanded from the basic 
concept to the most complicated operation. Network risk evaluation from 
primary standards does not fit well fit with cyber risk in military terms, hence, 
some risk management standards are developed for non-profit organization 
requirement but they do not yet consider the cyberwar environment.
In this article, we proposed a novel conceptual framework for Cyber Risk 
Assessment (CRA) which is well harmonized with NCW in the cyber warfare 
concept. With this framework, abstract notation from military risk environment 
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is parsed into a mathematical form that could be integrated with the technical 
notation from the network risk metric. The last outcome is called Cyber Risk 
Evaluation (CRE) subjected to a specific military environment. Our proposed 
CRA is now fulfilled from both quantitative and qualitative assessment. It is 
suitable for cyber risk assessment of both the common situation (e.g. normal 
activities) and uncommon condition (e.g. cyber terror and cyberwar). Risks 
that could significantly affect national cyber security are then investigated in-
depth for the best preparation to countermeasure these terrifying threats in the 
future. All communities related to IT security could take the benefits of this 
finding from the planning processes to action. Details of both case studies in 
SCADA and OSNs will be elaborated in future work.
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